PARKLAND (CBSMiami) – On February 14, 2018, as 17 students, teachers and staff were murdered, Kelvin Greenleaf worked as the security specialist at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School. Despite numerous security lapses on that tragic day, a law firm hired by the Broward School District to investigate Greenleaf’s actions determined that “there is insufficient evidence to support that Mr. Greenleaf violated any existing policy, procedure or Essential Performance Responsibility of Security Specialist.”

The investigation focused on several factors including whether Greenleaf had the campus monitors open the gate prior to dismissal that allowed confessed shooter Nikolas Cruz onto campus, properly communicated the “specific roles” for Campus Monitors and made sure that Campus Monitors were aware of proper Code Red policy and how to call one.

Ultimately, the report concluded that the gate Cruz walked through was “regularly opened shortly prior to dismissal” and the campus monitor who opened it would “return to his/her assigned post in the general area of that gate.” The report said that “(T)his was an established pattern and practice at the campus throughout Mr. Greenleaf’s tenure as Security Specialist” and that “Mr. Greenleaf was not responsible for making the decision” to have that gate “opened, unlocked and unstaffed” on the day of the shooting. In fact, former MSD Principal Ty Thompson said that there wasn’t a campus monitor to monitor each gate because there was “not enough man power to do that.”

The report also found that Greenleaf was not in a supervisory role over the other Campus Monitors, a group which included David Taylor, who was inside the Freshman Building when Cruz walked in, Andrew Medina, who spotted Cruz coming onto campus and Aaron Feis, who was shot and killed by Cruz. According to the investigation, Assistant Principal Winfred Porter was assigned by Thompson to oversee the campus monitors. Greenleaf worked with Porter on “developing and implementing safety programs” but “Greenleaf was not responsible for organizing such programs.” Greenleaf told investigators that he did not have the authority and was never asked to organize “a drill for any of the codes” during his time at MSD.

Because Greenleaf was not in a supervisory role, the investigation found that he did not violate any policies of procedures by not making sure that Campus Monitors “knew how or when to call a Code Red, or conducted a Code Red drill.”

Additionally, the report looked at whether Greenleaf should have ensured that Code Red policies were in place in classrooms. However, there was no policy or requirement that Greenleaf do that.

Greenleaf did attend an active shooter training in 2017 that focused on “school site plans” and “active/shooter/killer/run, hide and fight” training. However, Greenleaf “did not believe it was his job duty or responsibility to use the information learned” at the training to “‘organize and administer’ a school safety program at MSD.” The training appeared to be for “informational purposes.”

The investigation found that at the time of the shooting, the School District’s Emergency Preparedness Manual did not contain “any guidelines on an emergency involving a Code Red situation, an active shooter or an active killer. The Manual does not contain a requirement or form for any Code Red drill.”

Greenleaf was interviewed twice by investigators for the report. CBS 4 News spoke to Greenleaf briefly on Tuesday but he declined to comment for this article.

Ryan Petty, whose daughter Alaina was murdered at MSD, told CBS 4 News in a statement that the “Greenleaf is more evidence of the failure of BCPS leaders to protect our students and teachers. The lack of an active shooter policy, adequate training and clearly defined responsibilities contributed to the chaos of 2/14/2018, where 17 students and staff payed the ultimate price. Unfortunately, it is in the interest of Superintendent Robert Runcie and members of the school board to tolerate ineptitude, ambiguity and failure to insulate them from responsibility for their failures.”

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